

THE KREMLIN'S ESPIONAGE AND TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

TESTIMONY OF PETR S. DERIABIN
Former Officer of the USSR's Committee of State Security (KGB)

HEARING **BEFORE THE** **COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES** **HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES** **EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS** **FIRST SESSION**

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COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

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CONTENTS

Synopsis.....	Page 1
Testimony of— Petr S. Deriabin.....	3
Index.....	1

III

PUBLIC LAW 601, 79TH CONGRESS

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress [1946], chapter 753, 2d session, which provides:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, * * **

PART 2—RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

RULE X

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES

* * * * *
18. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

(q) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities.

(A) Un-American activities.

(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

RULE XII

LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES

SEC. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 86TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 7, January 7, 1959

* * * * *

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,

* * * * *

(q) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

* * * * *

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

18. Committee on Un-American Activities.

(a) Un-American activities.

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* * * * *

26. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

VI

SYNOPSIS

The operations of both the KGB (Committee of State Security) and the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence service, are portrayed by Petr S. Deriabin, a former officer of the Soviet secret police who defected to the West in 1954, in the accompanying testimony. The KGB, in addition to being responsible for carrying out foreign espionage for the Soviet Union, is also charged with protecting the U.S.S.R.'s internal security. As part of this latter function, it guards and maintains surveillance over the top Soviet leaders.

There are approximately 16,000 officers in the KGB who are assigned not only to provide physical security to the leaders of the Soviet Government but also to maintain a surveillance over them, Deriabin stated.

He described the luxury and debauchery of the private lives of the top leaders of the Soviet Government and pointed out the intrigue and distrust which pervades their relationships.

The foreign section of the Soviet civilian espionage service (KGB), consisting of 3,000 officers in headquarters in Moscow and about 15,000 officers around the world, "is responsible for espionage and counterespionage abroad; also for surveilling Soviet and satellite citizens who travel abroad; and is responsible for carrying out occasional assassinations, kidnaping, blackmail, and similar activities," Deriabin stated.

He continued:

Soviet intelligence most of the time is using methods like blackmail, bribery, and they include prisoners of war who spend some time inside the Soviet Union. They are using immigrants. Sometimes they send as immigrants to another country their own citizens to make some kind of spy network. Actually, they are working in two ways. They use legal channels and illegal channels and foreign missions and exchange groups, too.

For instance, when the Soviet delegation is going abroad, it always includes some intelligence or counterintelligence officers.

For instance, in 1957 there was a Soviet delegation, a construction delegation in the United States, which includes one Soviet intelligence officer whose name is Major Zagorsky, who was a member of that Soviet delegation. When the Moiseyev dancers were here, Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Kudriavtsev was a member of the Moiseyev dancers who is working for Soviet intelligence for many years, and he is a colonel. Both of them were working with me in Moscow while I was there.

Another example was in 1956, when the Soviet religious delegation was here, the Soviet Orthodox Church. The chief

2 THE KREMLIN'S ESPIONAGE AND TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

of that was Archbishop Nikolai. He is not a member of KGB, but he is an agent of KGB since World War II, who gives information to KGB. KGB is asking him and he is giving information. He is actually an agent.

In addition to the civilian foreign espionage service (KGB), there is also the military foreign intelligence service (GRU) which has many more agents than does the civilian foreign espionage service, Deriabin asserted.

With reference to the methods used by these two foreign espionage operations of the Soviet Government, Deriabin stated:

The first thing is blackmail and bribery and Communist sympathies, Communist sympathizers, and using methods of provocation. This is the general method.

* * * * *

I would say they use open code, secret writing, couriers, contacts with legal residents, by radio and through agents whom they send to take information.

* * * * *

Of course, they are working through other branches, such as the diplomatic, press, Intourist, commercial relations, scientific and professional groups, and cultural exchanges. Every possibility they use for their intelligence work.

After describing the many branches of the Soviet secret police organizations operating against the people themselves in the Soviet Union, Deriabin concluded:

Moscow is the headquarters of the Soviet secret police. Each Soviet Republic has another headquarters. In each region and district they have a branch of the KGB in Soviet life, I would say economical, cultural, and political life inside the Soviet Union watched over by some kind of directorate which is under KGB.

If it is cultural life, it is under the political directorate; the economical life to the economical directorate, and the military life to military directorate. They are taking care of all the people. They are working through sources and agents.

Every Soviet office, every Soviet collective farm, every factory, has a representative of KGB who has his own agents in the factory, in the office, and everywhere. There are so many agents and sources who are working for the KGB, in every Soviet apartment building and everywhere. You can find them everywhere.

I would say, in general, about every 15 persons in the Soviet Union are covered by 1 source or 1 agent inside the Soviet Union—an informer.

THE KREMLIN'S ESPIONAGE AND TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

Testimony of Petr S. Deriabin, Former Officer of the U.S.S.R.'s Committee of State Security (KGB)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session, pursuant to call, in room 226, House Office Building, Hon. Francis E. Walter (chairman) presiding.

Committee member present: Representative Francis E. Walter, of Pennsylvania.

Staff member present: Richard Arens, staff director.

The CHAIRMAN. May we come to order.

Will you raise your right hand, please? Do you swear the testimony you are about to give in the matter now pending will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. DERIABIN. Yes, I do.

TESTIMONY OF PETR S. DERIABIN, A FORMER OFFICER OF THE SOVIET COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY

The CHAIRMAN. May the record today reflect that the witness who is about to testify has been the subject of careful, thorough checking by the Committee on Un-American Activities with appropriate security agencies of the Government of the United States, and found to be thoroughly reliable, trustworthy, and in all respects bona fide with respect to his background and the experiences which he shall now relate for the first time for public revelation.

Before proceeding, I might say that, moreover, it is the information of this committee from unimpeachable intelligence sources in this Government that, over the course of the last 5 years, the witness who is about to testify has rendered to the Government of the United States, via intelligence and other appropriate agencies of the Government, invaluable services.

Now, Mr. Arens, you may proceed.

Mr. ARENS. Kindly state your full name.

Mr. DERIABIN. My name is Petr Sergeyevich Deriabin.

Mr. ARENS. Where and when were you born?

Mr. DERIABIN. I was born in the U.S.S.R. in Siberia, a small village named Lokot, in 1921—February 21, 1921.

Mr. ARENS. Now, would you kindly give us just a brief word about your early life prior to the time that you reached adulthood?

4 THE KREMLIN'S ESPIONAGE AND TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. DERIABIN. My parents were peasants until 1930's. In the 1930's they were forced to the collective farms. My father died in 1936 and my mother died in 1941.

I graduated from the Soviet Teachers Institute after 2 years. I was working as a teacher from 1937 until 1939. In 1939 I was called into the Soviet Army, where I spent from 1939 until 1944. In that time I was—

Mr. ARENS. In what capacity did you serve in the Soviet Army?

Mr. DERIABIN. In the Soviet Army I was in the first year Deputy Chief Political Commissar in the Sergeants School, noncommissioned officers' school, and then I was secretary in the Komsomol.

Mr. ARENS. What was that school?

Mr. DERIABIN. Before I was in school I was Deputy Political Commissar. Then I was assigned to, and was secretary of, the Youth Communist League in my regiment—in my infantry regiment.

Mr. ARENS. How long did you serve in that capacity?

Mr. DERIABIN. For 1 year.

Mr. ARENS. Then what was your next assignment?

Mr. DERIABIN. The next assignment was when World War II started, and at that time I was in the war from 1941 until 1944. At that time I was deputy chief of Materiel Company on the Stalingrad front and the Ukrainian front, and then I was assistant to the chief of staff of a regiment.

During the war I was wounded four times, and then through the party committee of my division, by order and by myself, I joined the Counter-Intelligence School in Moscow. It was in April 1944.

In that school I spent 1 year, until April 1945. Since 1945 and 1947 I was working as case officer in the headquarters of the counter-intelligence in Moscow.

Mr. ARENS. Then what was your next assignment after 1947?

Mr. DERIABIN. In the same year, 1947, I spent a few months in, I would say, the MVD,¹ in the State of Altai. I was in that provincial MVD office as a case officer and chief of the surveillance group.

Mr. ARENS. When did that service in that capacity terminate?

Mr. DERIABIN. It was over in February 1947.

Mr. ARENS. Would you kindly tell us your next assignment?

Mr. DERIABIN. The next assignment was since, I would say, March 1947, until April 1952, I was working in the Guard Directorate of the Soviet secret police.

Mr. ARENS. Where were you stationed?

Mr. DERIABIN. The station was in Moscow.

Mr. ARENS. What were your particular duties?

Mr. DERIABIN. My duty was I was 1 year case officer and in the second year senior case officer and deputy chief of subsection and chief of subsection in that Guard Directorate. Actually the work was I was checking the people and officers who were working for the Guard Directorate. Actually, that Guard Directorate was taking care of guarding Soviet leaders, members of the Central Committee of the government.

Mr. ARENS. What was your next assignment?

¹ Ministry of Internal Affairs (secret police agency), which was then responsible for the internal security of the Soviet Union.

Mr. DERIABIN. From April 1952 until September 1953 I was working in the Austrian-German section, for the Soviet Intelligence Directorate.

Mr. ARENS. Where were you stationed?

Mr. DERIABIN. The station was in Moscow, too.

In September 1953, I was assigned to Vienna and was working as intelligence officer in the Soviet MGB¹ station in Vienna.

Mr. ARENS. Then tell us in a word, please, sir, what transpired next in your life.

Mr. DERIABIN. I was in Vienna until February 15, 1954. I decided on that day, February 15, 1954, I went to American headquarters in Vienna and asked for asylum.

Mr. ARENS. Tell us in a word what happened next.

Mr. DERIABIN. I spent a few days in the American Zone in Austria in asking them permission to go to the United States, because they asked me what I would like to do and what I am going to do. First I asked them about political asylum. They gave me, I would say, about 10 days or 2 weeks, then I arrived in the United States and was since, I would say, February 28, 1954, I leave for United States.

Mr. ARENS. Now would you kindly proceed at your own pace to tell us about the Okhrana,² its size, responsibilities, and its methods. First of all, what is the Okhrana?

Mr. DERIABIN. Okhrana is actually the secret service of the Soviet State Security, and is responsible for guarding its leaders against the people. The size—I would say the exact number of officers working there in 1953 was 16,000 officers. Actually, the Guard Directorate is just in Moscow, because they are especially to guard the leaders of government.

Mr. ARENS. And a word about its methods?

Mr. DERIABIN. Well, they are guarding physically, armed and unarmed civilians, the people. They carry out surveillance and operations, security checks of all the people that may come in contact with the government leaders, in addition to providing physical security.

Mr. ARENS. Does the Okhrana also maintain a surveillance over the hierarchy itself within the Soviet Government?

Mr. DERIABIN. Yes, they do.

Mr. ARENS. Why?

Mr. DERIABIN. Well, as far as I know, all Soviet leaders doesn't trust each other and in this purpose they have the civilians against each other.

Mr. ARENS. To whom did the Okhrana report when you were in it?

Mr. DERIABIN. Okhrana actually reported to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

Mr. ARENS. And what was the source of its information?

Mr. DERIABIN. Well, actually there was the chief of the Guard Directorate who was responsible, during Stalin's day, to Stalin; and after Stalin died he was responsible to Malenkov and, the last time, I believe, responsible to Khrushchev. Actually, to be chief of Guard Directorate, you were under the Central Committee. The Minister of State Security, he is the boss, but he is not actually the boss.

¹ Ministry of State Security, the Soviet foreign espionage service. Technically, the MGB had been absorbed by the MVD on March 6, 1953, and remained a part of it until March 1954.

² While "Okhrana" was the name of the Czarist secret police, it is also a Russian term meaning "guard" or "protection." Personnel assigned to the MVD's Guard Directorate, among themselves, refer to this section as the "Okhrana."

Mr. ARENS. He is the head of it but not actually the boss?

Mr. DERIABIN. That is right. Actually the Central Committee is the boss of the Guard Directorate.

Mr. ARENS. Then the man who is head of the Central Committee would be boss of the Okhrana?

Mr. DERIABIN. That is right.

Mr. ARENS. From what sources does the Okhrana obtain its information?

Mr. DERIABIN. Well, of course, they use as sources agents in the households, barbers, cooks, waitresses, drivers, and others who are working around leaders.

Mr. ARENS. Can you give us a further word about their security measures?

Mr. DERIABIN. The guard officers, they are around the leaders all day and all night. When a leader is sitting in the office, the guards are around the office. When leaders are going in the parade, demonstrations, making speeches, traveling, taking a rest, always Okhrana is with them, any place and everywhere.

Mr. ARENS. Did you have personal experience of being at close range with the principal leaders of the international Communist apparatus stationed in Moscow?

Mr. DERIABIN. If you say about Soviet leaders, who I believe are leaders of international communism, I saw all of them. I was close to them, not exactly working close to them, but I saw them in the offices; I saw them in the demonstrations, in the Red Square, of some meetings, conferences, and so on.

For instance, Stalin, Khrushchev, Malenkov, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and others. Although as an Okhrana agent I did not work with them in their governmental capacities in administering the affairs of state, I did, as an Okhrana man, have intimate contact with them in their offices, in their private lives, such men as Stalin, Khrushchev, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Zhukov, Bulganin, and virtually all of the top leadership at one time or another.

Mr. ARENS. On the basis of this intimate observation of these leaders of international communism in your capacity as an Okhrana agent, do you have any observations to make respecting their so-called humanitarian concepts and dedication to the people?

Mr. DERIABIN. I would say working in the Guard Directorate, I found that Soviet leaders do not work for their own people. They are working and living just for themselves. Actually, when they are making speeches and talking to the people that they are serving for the people, actually it is not true.

Most of them are serving for themselves. Of course, most of the Soviet leaders are real Communists and they believe in Communist theory. Some of them don't know actually what is capitalism. I would like, if it is all right with you, to put one example in.

Mr. ARENS. Please do.

Mr. DERIABIN. I was in the U.S. Congress a few days ago, just to see around, and I saw where Congressmen dined. It seems to be the same as other restaurants in the United States, especially Washington, Virginia, and Maryland. I didn't see too much difference between what the Congressmen eat and what the people eat in the restaurants.

THE KREMLIN'S ESPIONAGE AND TERROR ORGANIZATIONS 7

Well, if I would say to the Soviet people about the U.S. Congressmen, how they are living and dining and working in that place, they would never believe with me, because all Soviet people think that the U.S. Congressmen don't work for the people; that they have big offices with gold and packets of money and are just taking a rest while they are working for the Congress.

The Soviet people think about this because in the Soviet Union all ministers or members of the Soviet Congress have big offices; they have the best service in the Soviet Union; they have cars, drivers, chauffeurs, barbers, and so on, and guards around them.

Soviet leaders explain to the people that they have to live better than the people because they are working all day, all night, for the people; that that is the reason why they have to have everything. Actually, they are not worried too much about the people. They are concerned for themselves.

Mr. ARENS. From the experience which you had as an Okhrana agent, with close association or contact with the top echelon of the Communist apparatus in Moscow, do you care to express yourself respecting the way in which they conduct their private affairs, their private lives?

Mr. DERIABIN. Well, every Soviet leader has his own private life, and the people don't know how they live. They don't like to show to the people how they live. Actually, the guard officer has to sign the paper before they take a job to guard somebody that they will never talk to anybody about what they are doing, with whom they are doing, with whom they are working, and how they are working. Every Soviet leader has his own private life. All of them have good houses, which belong to the government. Actually, they live in it.

They have private hospitals, stores, drugs, and private homes where they are taking rests and everything. But the people know that all of these places belong to the government. Actually the Soviet top leaders use them.

The people don't know about that. The top leaders have their own collective farms which raise vegetables and fruits, and lakes where they are growing fish for them, and on the collective farms they grow sheep, produce milk and butter and everything.

For example, Stalin's family; of course, I saw so many times Stalin's son, Vasilii, who was actually an alcoholic and a thoroughly corrupted individual; always too much drinking, with prostitutes, organizing loud parties in his own place and somewhere else.

If you take, for example, some Soviet top echelon leaders, for instance, secretary of Moscow Party Committee one time was Mr. Popov, who was organizing many, many times parties, I would say every week two or three, with prostitutes, with dancing on the tables and too much drinking.

For example, one Soviet Minister of Railroad Transport was Kovalev, who made a big wedding party for the daughter. He built a railroad spur from Moscow to their country house, about 40 kilometers. Then there was the marriage train, with many cars on it, and a few hundred guests who went on that party. They spent the government's money. Kovalev has a big house near the Black Sea. I didn't see in the United States some millionaires live like Soviet ministers live in that country.

8 THE KREMLIN'S ESPIONAGE AND TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. ARENS. After your assignment with the Okhrana, you said you were transferred to the foreign section of the MGB, which I understand is now the KGB.¹ Can you tell us something about its size, responsibilities, and methods?

Mr. DERIABIN. I would say the size of the foreign section of the Soviet civilian intelligence is about 3,000 officers in headquarters in Moscow and about 15,000 officers around the world, working as representatives of the Soviet Government abroad. The foreign section of the Soviet civilian intelligence service is responsible for espionage and counterespionage abroad; also for surveilling Soviet and satellite citizens who travel abroad; and is responsible for carrying out occasional assassinations, kidnaping, blackmail, and similar activities.

Mr. ARENS. What are the methods used by the MGB?

Mr. DERIABIN. Soviet intelligence most of the time is using methods like blackmail, bribery, and they include prisoners of war who spend some time inside the Soviet Union. They are using immigrants. Sometimes they send as immigrants to another country their own citizens to make some kind of spy network. Actually, they are working in two ways. They use legal channels and illegal channels and foreign missions and exchange groups, too.

For instance, when the Soviet delegation is going abroad, it always includes some intelligence or counterintelligence officers.

For instance, in 1957 there was a Soviet delegation, a construction delegation in the United States, which includes one Soviet intelligence officer whose name is Major Zagorsky, who was a member of that Soviet delegation. When the Moiseyev dancers were here, Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Kudriavtsev was a member of the Moiseyev dancers who is working for Soviet intelligence for many years, and he is a colonel. Both of them were working with me in Moscow while I was there.

Another example was in 1956, when the Soviet religious delegation was here, the Soviet Orthodox Church. The chief of that was Archbishop Nikolai. He is not a member of KGB, but he is an agent of KGB since World War II, who gives information to KGB. KGB is asking him and he is giving information. He is actually an agent.

Mr. ARENS. To what extent does the MGB, now the KGB, employ or exploit what we would generally call low-level informers within a country in which they are operating?

Mr. DERIABIN. Well, of course, Soviet intelligence is using all kinds of persons if it is possible to recruit them, on any level—the low level, the middle level, the high level.

Mr. ARENS. What information can you tell us on this record respecting Col. Rudolf Abel?

Mr. DERIABIN. Well, as far as I know, he had in his apartment a radio and other technical equipment, and he was working under deep, deep cover. I would say he was doing spy work, was going to take some kind of scientific information from the United States.

Mr. ARENS. Now, may I ask you a pointed question respecting defectors: To what extent does the KGB use phony defectors in hopes that they would gain the confidence of authorities of free countries?

Mr. DERIABIN. They use them very often because it is very hard now for Soviets to put their own agents inside the United States or

¹Committee of State Security, so named in March 1954 when the MVD lost a number of its former functions. The KGB now has charge of both internal security and foreign espionage for the Soviet Union.

THE KREMLIN'S ESPIONAGE AND TERROR ORGANIZATIONS 9

other Western countries. It is very hard to recruit, actually, American people to be Soviet spies. For this reason they are using their own agents. They order them to go to the United States under political asylum—ask for political asylum, and then become Soviet spies. Through them they are going to find methods of American intelligence, how America is working. Maybe America will recruit them and send them back inside the Soviet Union if they can be used for her purposes. Or another thing is to penetrate immigration organizations, groups, trying by penetrating the immigration barriers of various nations to break down the various organized émigré groups within the free countries. This is a special effort.

Of course, sometimes they send an agent and order him not to start work until given a signal. Maybe he will stay 10 years or more and then start to work.

Mr. ARENS. Do they have "sleepers"?

Mr. DERIABIN. Yes.

Mr. ARENS. And a sleeper is a man who is idle until he is given a signal; is that right?

Mr. DERIABIN. That is right.

Mr. ARENS. The KGB is, of course, not the only Soviet intelligence service.

Mr. DERIABIN. No; it is not the only Soviet intelligence service. There is another intelligence service under the General Staff of Soviet Army. They call them GRU, Soviet military intelligence, which is under the General Staff of the Soviet Army.

Mr. ARENS. Then is it a fair characterization, in general, that the Soviet has two major intelligence services engaging in foreign espionage, the KGB and the GRU, the latter being the intelligence operation of the military?

Mr. DERIABIN. Right.

Mr. ARENS. What are the main targets for Soviet intelligence operations in the West?

Mr. DERIABIN. The first, Soviet intelligence working against the United States, and the second, against NATO members.

Mr. ARENS. What is the top priority?

Mr. DERIABIN. The first enemy for the Soviet Union is the United States, and the second, the members of NATO organizations. Against them, Soviet intelligence works.

Mr. ARENS. What do these intelligence services seek here?

Mr. DERIABIN. They are going to find any kind of information about the United States and members of NATO—economic, political, military, including everything that is possible to use in the future.

Mr. ARENS. Based upon your background and experience, please describe briefly how the Soviet intelligence operations are organized in a typical Western free country, perhaps, may I suggest, the United States.

Mr. DERIABIN. Soviet intelligence works in two ways. First, legal residents and, second, illegal residents. I would say legal agents and illegal agents.

For instance, the United States has a Soviet Embassy. In the Soviet Embassy there is a legal Soviet resident or boss of Soviet intelligence and some other officers who are working for the embassy. They are KGB officers.

10 THE KREMLIN'S ESPIONAGE AND TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

In another case there is an illegal resident, for example, as was Abel—Col. Rudolf Abel.

I would say in each country Soviet intelligence has one legal resident and maybe one, two, three, or more illegal residents.

They also have legal Soviet intelligence working under the Soviet Embassy, Tass correspondents, Soviet trade organizations, international organizations, personnel such as in the satellite embassies and consulates.

Mr. ARENS. Do you mean Tass, the Soviet press representatives?

Mr. DERIABIN. That is right.

Mr. ARENS. Based upon your background and experience, is it your judgment they presently have espionage agents in Tass?

Mr. DERIABIN. Well, actually I would say 60 or 70 percent of the representatives of Tass are KGB members, actually Soviet intelligence officers.

Mr. ARENS. And what about Amtorg, the Soviet trade organization which is operating in the United States?

Mr. DERIABIN. I believe, and I believe it was before as it is now, that the Soviet used Amtorg for its intelligence work. For instance, the Foreign Trade Ministry has its own intelligence agency. I would say if you ask Ambassador Menshikov,¹ he knows very well how Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry works in the intelligence field.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have firsthand information respecting Ambassador Menshikov's background in intelligence work?

Mr. DERIABIN. Actually, I don't know if Menshikov is a member of Soviet intelligence or Soviet MGB, but Menshikov was working inside Soviet Union as Minister of Foreign Trade and Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, and I know in that ministry he has his own intelligence section which is working close to KGB intelligence service. Sometimes KGB intelligence puts their own officers in the intelligence section of the Trade Ministry, and went abroad as representatives.

Mr. ARENS. I don't believe, sir, our record is quite clear on your estimate of the number of GRU military intelligence personnel operating out of Moscow. Would you care to give us your best judgment on that?

Mr. DERIABIN. I would not presume to give a precise estimate, but I am confident that there are many more agents in the military intelligence of the Soviet empire than there are in the civilian service, the KGB.

Mr. ARENS. What were the instructions given to the civilian intelligence service, of which you were a part, respecting strategies, tactics, and activities of that service against the United States?

Mr. DERIABIN. In July or August 1953, when Panyushkin² became a boss of Soviet intelligence, he gave instructions to all intelligence officers, and that instruction said—actually, it was making his point in a letter and in a meeting, which was in Moscow in August of 1953. He said that it is very hard now to get information from the United States, and we have to organize our work against the United States from other countries, especially from organized bases in Latin American countries. Then we have to work against the United States from East Germany, from Austria, and other European countries.

¹ Mikhail A. Menshikov, present Soviet Ambassador to the United States.

² Maj. Gen. Aleksandr S. Panyushkin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, 1947-52.

What Panyushkin said was that everybody knows our first enemy is the United States and the NATO organizations. We have to work against them. That was it in general.

Mr. ARENS. May I ask, how does this square up with the professions of Khrushchev for peaceful coexistence and the hand of friendship which he professes to be constantly extending to the free countries, particularly to the United States?

Mr. DERIABIN. I don't believe what Khrushchev is saying. I know what Khrushchev is doing. When Khrushchev said that he is for peace he is really not for peace. He is going to build communism not just in the Soviet Union. He would like to build communism around the world.

Mr. ARENS. If we have concluded on that subject, may I inquire if you would like to give us further detail on the various methods by which the Soviet intelligence service recruits agents in the free countries.

Mr. DERIABIN. The first thing is blackmail and bribery and Communist sympathies, Communist sympathizers, and using methods of provocation. This is the general method.

Mr. ARENS. How do the Soviet agents in the free countries communicate with the Moscow headquarters?

Mr. DERIABIN. I would say they use open code, secret writing, couriers, contacts with legal residents, by radio and through agents whom they send to take information.

Mr. ARENS. Aside from its own professional staff of officers and trained agents, do the Soviet intelligence services make use of other branches of the Soviet Government?

Mr. DERIABIN. Of course, they are working through other branches, such as the diplomatic, press, Intourist, commercial relations, scientific and professional groups, and cultural exchanges. Every possibility they use for their intelligence work.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have facts about any kidnappings or assassinations by the Soviet intelligence services operating in the West?

Mr. DERIABIN. Well, I had some connection with kidnaping Dr. Walter Linse in 1952 from West Berlin.

Mr. ARENS. Would you tell us about it, please, sir?

Mr. DERIABIN. Well, I am going to talk about Lausman,¹ though I didn't mention it.

Lausman was the Czechoslovakian Minister in June 1948 in Czechoslovakia. Then he left Czechoslovakia. He was living in Salzburg, in Austria. He was working for freedom and was talking about what is going on in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia intelligence asked Soviet intelligence to help them to kidnap Mr. Lausman. Czechoslovakia sent three agents to Salzburg. They gave some kind of narcotics and drugs to Mr. Lausman, put him in a car, and took him through the West Austrian Zone to the Soviet Zone, and the Soviets gave them two cars and guards, etc., and they took Mr. Lausman to Prague, to Czechoslovakia. As far as I know, Mr. Lausman woke up when he was in Prague.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have any other cases which you could recount from your own knowledge?

¹ Bohumil Lausman, Deputy Prime Minister and Administrator of Industry in Czechoslovakia before the Communist coup in 1948.

Mr. DERTABIN. In West Berlin there is an organization, Free Jurists Union.¹ In 1952, that Free Jurists Union was going to organize an international conference of jurists there. At that time, Soviet intelligence had a plan to kidnap Dr. Friedenau, who was boss of that. When the plan was all ready to kidnap Dr. Friedenau, he left West Berlin and went to Stockholm, to Sweden, to prepare a meeting with other jurists.

Dr. Linse, who was the chief of economic section in that Free Jurists Union, was in charge to organize this international meeting. Then Soviet intelligence, using their agents, who were Germans by nationality, kidnaped Dr. Linse from West Berlin to East Berlin. While kidnaping him Dr. Linse started to struggle. One man took a gun, one Soviet agent, and shot him in his leg to put Dr. Linse inside the car. They put him inside the car and took him to the Soviet Zone. Then there was the trial.

After a while they took him inside the Soviet Union. I don't know what happened, if they put him for 25 years in jail or they killed him.

But in that time they answered the Western countries that they did nothing to Dr. Linse, that they had nothing to do with him, with Dr. Linse.

Mr. ARENS. I understand you were present in Moscow at the time of Stalin's death; is that correct?

Mr. DERTABIN. Right.

Mr. ARENS. Did you gain any information or impressions about the circumstances of his death and the power struggle which followed?

Mr. DERTABIN. In this question, I would say I saw a movie here on TV about Stalin's death. I would say 70 or 75 percent of the show in that movie is true. I am telling this because at that time while I was working in the Guard Directorate, and while I was working in the Intelligence Directorate, it was many, many times a shakeup in the Guard Directorate. The leadership or the bosses in the Guard Directorate, there was five of them in 1951, 1952, and 1953, for 3 years it was five new bosses.

Mr. ARENS. May I ask you in passing what happened to the various bosses?

Mr. DERTABIN. I would answer better if I give you a name. The first boss was Lieutenant General Vlasik.

Mr. ARENS. What happened to him?

Mr. DERTABIN. They put him in jail. He was staying for a few weeks and then he was dead in jail. Whether they beat him or so—he was healthy when they took him and put him in jail.

Then actually guarding Stalin, were three colonels. One was sent to Novosibirsk; one colonel was sent to Omsk, in Siberia; one colonel was sent to Molotov city, in northeast Russia. It was known as Perm.

Actually, they sent them in the concentration, not to be boss but sent as assistant to boss—everyone to be an assistant to a boss in a concentration camp.

When Stalin was alive, in 1952, it was making orders by Malenkov and some other leaders that they cut Stalin's guards 50 percent in 1952. Then there was another boss, Ignat'yev, who lost his job. Now he is working as a party boss in some Soviet Republic.

¹ Investigating Committee of Free Jurists, also known as League of Free Jurists.

There was another boss, Major General Kusmechev, who was shot just after Stalin's death. I was talking about who was exactly boss. There was a big shakeup in the Guard Directorate, and they sent so many people to Siberia. So after Stalin died, no member of his Guard Directorate was left in Moscow. Everybody was ordered to go to Siberia or somewhere. Nobody stayed to work for KGB or for intelligence. They were completely sent out, all over the place. The particular organization was disbanded.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have information respecting the power struggle which followed Stalin's death?

Mr. DERIABIN. When Stalin died, we were waiting that Malenkov would become the boss of the Communist Party and Molotov would become the boss of the Soviet Government. It doesn't happen. We found 2 or 3 weeks after Stalin's death that Beria was doing something, was going to take over the Soviet Government.

Actually in June 1953 I was walking the Moscow streets and I saw tanks and troops around Moscow. The next morning when Beria was arrested—actually it was nighttime—I met some friends of mine working in the Guard Directorate. I asked them why were tanks around the Moscow streets, and that man answered to me that he went to Beria's home—actually, he was responsible for checking Beria's guards, officers, and he said he found the military officers staying around Beria's house, that Beria was arrested.

Mr. ARENS. What significance do you attach to the fact that there were tanks and troops around Beria's home?

Mr. DERIABIN. Well, at that time I was thinking something is going wrong. I was going to the office and was going to find what it was, because at nighttime, I think at 2 o'clock at night, I was going home, after my work. Actually we worked most of the time at night.

I found the tanks. I didn't get any information until the morning. But in that time, so many KGB officers were fired and put in jail, and actually I didn't know whether I would be alive or not.

Mr. ARENS. You have told us about the apparatus which guards the high echelon of the Communist Government officials, and you have told us about the two principal segments of their overseas intelligence operations. Although you did not personally serve in the secret police which operate against the people themselves in the Soviet Union, could you give us a word about the organization, structure, number, and activities of that service in the Soviet Union?

Mr. DERIABIN. Well, under Soviet secret police there are so many directorates. I would like to tell you that there are two important directorates, the secret political directorate, which is watching Soviet intelligentsia, and government employees, and who is not working in the factory or in the field.

Well, they have a few sections in that directorate, and under each section they have the responsibility to answer for some ministries, some departments of government.

There is another economical directorate under the secret police, which is taking care of Soviet industry, machinery, and agriculture.

They are watching the people and giving information for the Communist Party and for the government, what is going on inside the Soviet Union.

The third is the military counterintelligence, which is working by the same methods as the secret political directorate or the economical directorate, but just inside the Soviet Army.

Moscow is the headquarters of the Soviet secret police. Each Soviet Republic has another headquarters. In each region and district they have a branch of the KGB in Soviet life, I would say economical, cultural, and political life inside the Soviet Union watched over by some kind of directorate which is under KGB.

If it is cultural life, it is under the political directorate; the economical life to the economical directorate, and the military life to military directorate. They are taking care of all the people. They are working through sources and agents.

Every Soviet office, every Soviet collective farm, every factory, has a representative of KGB who has his own agents in the factory, in the office, and everywhere. There are so many agents and sources who are working for the KGB, in every Soviet apartment building and everywhere. You can find them everywhere.

I would say, in general, about every 15 persons in the Soviet Union are covered by 1 source or 1 agent inside the Soviet Union—an informer.

Mr. ARENS. Is the record clear that it is your judgment that approximately 1 out of every 15 persons in the Soviet Union is either an informer or an agent for the secret police?

Mr. DERIABIN. Do not make a mistake. Soviet KGB is working close to the Communist Party. And the Communist Party has to get all information to the KGB about the people, and the KGB has to give information to the Communist Party about the people, too.

If you put together the members of the Communist Party and the sources of KGB, it will be exactly what you say.

Mr. ARENS. Is there any other comment or observation that you should like to make on this record, which you understand will be made public?

Mr. DERIABIN. I would say now so many correspondents and American people are talking about the new Soviet laws, which was published in September 1958, and sometime Khrushchev said that KGB does not have too much authority now as it had before. I would say it was the election in March and February inside the Soviet Union, in each Republic election, the Supreme Council of the Republic, through the Soviet press which I read now sometimes, I see—I found 49 chiefs of KGB and MVD elected to membership of the Supreme Council during the last election.

I would say before, when Stalin was alive, it was less members of KGB who were elected working for the government than it is now. The Soviet criminal code, published in 1958, is stronger than it was as the Soviet criminal code before.

Mr. ARENS. Have you any comments to make on a public record respecting other prospective defectors, such as yourself, or any others who, at one time, had plans to defect?

Mr. DERIABIN. To answer this question I would say that, of course, there are some Soviet officers in intelligence work or Soviet diplomats who would like to join the West. But there are so many difficulties for them to do this. All of them have some relatives or parents, or close relatives, inside the Soviet Union.

If some of them go to the West, it means that the Soviet Government, especially KGB, will put their relatives in jail or send them to Siberia because there is the Soviet law about that.

Of course, these officers who would like to join the West, they don't like to be an enemy of their relatives. That is one thing which stops them.

Another thing is most of the Soviet officers who are abroad now, especially in the United States or in other countries, they don't know well how is life in other countries, and they don't know well how the new government will meet them.

The third thing is they don't know what to do in this country. It is very good to say, "I got freedom," so they have to work when they join the West and do something. Most of the Soviet diplomats and intelligence officers, they didn't do any kind of jobs, especially physically or something else. All their lives they serve for the government, as intelligence officers, as a diplomat or some other representative. It is very hard for them to start a new life. They then don't know exactly if, for instance, the U.S. Government will help them or not. I wish they could know of my experience. I find so many friends in the United States and everything is just fine.

But first when I arrived I didn't know what to do, how to live, and so and so. Of course, Americans have helped me a lot, and I am in good shape now.

Mr. ARENS. You have told us, off the record, have you not, certain instances in which high-ranking Communists behind the Iron Curtain have, to your certain knowledge, built up bank accounts in the free world?

Mr. DERIABIN. In answer to this question, I would say that the Soviet secret service is taking care of all Communist leaders around the world. They like to have any kind of information about them, especially about the leaders of satellite countries. Actually they have advisers to guard them. Especially when I was working in the Austro-German section, we had a special branch which was taking care of East German Government, the East German police, and the East German military service.

We had the files, specially on Walter Ulbricht, who is Deputy Premier in East Germany.

In the file of Walter Ulbricht there was information that Ulbricht has a niece or some relatives in the United States, and through her he put money in an American bank for his future. If something happens in East Germany, he will have money then.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have any other instances like that you can tell on the public record?

Mr. DERIABIN. Well, about Rau, Deputy Premier of the East German Government, the KGB thought that he was an agent of the Nazis during the war.

In talking about satellite countries, I would like to say that the Soviet secret police always like to have information about the leaders of satellite Communist parties. For example, everybody knows that in Hungary, Hungarian dictator Rakosi is now inside the Soviet Union. One Soviet KGB colonel, his name being Yevkimenko, who was Soviet intelligence adviser to the Hungarian Government, he had his own sources around Rakosi. One of his sources went to see Rakosi, it was 1951, and told him that Soviet boss of intelligence would like it if he became his informer or his agent.

16 THE KREMLIN'S ESPIONAGE AND TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

Rakosi called the Soviet adviser and told him, "Why are you going to have agents around me? You have to know that I am the first agent of the Soviet Union."

The CHAIRMAN. May I express to you appreciation not only for your cooperation evidenced by the testimony which you have given today, but, likewise, for your cooperation with this committee, its staff, and agencies of the Government of the United States since your arrival on these shores.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, the hearing adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.)

INDEX

INDIVIDUALS

	Page
Abel, Rudolf	8, 10
Beria (Lavrenti)	13
Bulganin (Nikolai)	6
Deriabin, Petr Sergeyev	1, 2, 3-16 (testimony)
Friedenau (Theo)	12
Ignat'yev (S. D.)	12
Khrushchev	5, 6, 11, 14
Kovalev (Ivan V.)	7
Kudriavtsev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich	1, 8
Kusmechev	13
Lausman, Bohumil	11
Linse, Walter	11, 12
Malenkov (Georgi)	5, 6, 13
Menshikov, Mikhail A.	10
Mikoyan (Anastas I.)	6
Molotov (V. M.)	13
Nikolai (Dorofeyevich Yarushevich)	2, 8
Panyushkin, Aleksandr S.	10, 11
Popov (Georgi M.)	7
Rakosi (Matyas)	15, 16
Rau	15
Stalin, Josef	5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14
Stalin, Vasilii I.	7
Ulbricht, Walter	15
Vlasik	12
Yevkimenko	15
Zagorsky (Sergei A.)	1, 8
Zhukov (Georgi)	6

ORGANIZATIONS

American-Russian Trading Corp. (Amtorg)	10
Amtorg. (See American-Russian Trading Corp.)	
Communist Party, Soviet Union	14
Central Committee	5, 6
Moscow Party Committee	7
Free Jurists Union. (See Investigating Committee of Free Jurists.)	
Investigating Committee of Free Jurists (also known as Free Jurists Union and League of Free Jurists)	12
Komsomol. (See Young Communist League, Soviet Union.)	
Moiseyev Folk Dance Co.	8
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	9, 11
Tass News Agency	10
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Government of:	
Counter-Intelligence School (Moscow)	4
Foreign Trade Ministry	10
Ministry of War (Army):	
GRU (military intelligence)	1, 2, 9, 10
Sergeants School	4
Secret police	1-16
Guard Directorate (also known as Okhrana)	4, 5, 6, 12, 13
Intelligence Directorate	5, 12
KGB	1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15
MGB	5, 7, 8, 10
MVD	4, 5, 8, 14
Okhrana. (See Secret Police, Guard Directorate.)	
Supreme Soviet Council	14
Young Communist League, Soviet Union (Komsomol)	4